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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Margaret Lea Lewis appeals from the district court's order denying her motion to 
suppress evidence. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The district court found the following facts: 
On July 10, 2010, at approximately 23:25 (11 :25 P.M.), Lewis was 
operating a 1980 Ford traveling south on Mink Creek Road, Pocatello, 
Bannock County, Idaho. Deputy Lovell, of the Bannock County Sherriff's 
Department was operating his patrol vehicle in the same vicinity. Prior to 
coming into contact with Lewis, Deputy Lovell was also traveling south on 
Mink Creek Road. Mink Creek Road has a posted speed limit of forty-five 
(45) miles per hour. The road is painted with a center line and fog lines, 
with the south bound fog lines located on the right side of the roadway. 
Deputy Lovell first observed Lewis' vehicle weaving from left to right 
in her lane of travel. He observed the vehicle exit the road way to the right 
and come to a stop. Deputy Lovell pulled up behind the vehicle and also 
stopped. He activated his rear emergency lights for safety, but he did not 
activate his overhead lights. As he exited his vehicle to perform a welfare 
check, the Defendant turned on her vehicle's left signal light and then 
stuck her left arm out the window. Her elbow was resting on the bottom of 
the window frame of her driver side door and her forearm and hand were 
pointed upward. Deputy Lovell testified he thought that the Defendant 
was making a right tum signal with her arm. 
After Defendant activated her vehicle's left tum signal and put her 
arm out the window, she then pulled back out onto the roadway and 
resumed driving down the road. Deputy Lovell re-entered his vehicle and 
began to follow Lewis southbound on Mink Creek Road. Deputy Lovell 
testified that he observed Defendant's vehicle swerve right and touch the 
fog line, then a few seconds later he observed the vehicle completely 
cross over the fog line with its right tire. After crossing the fog line, the 
vehicle swerved back into its lane of traffic and then activated its right turn 
signal. The vehicle then turned right onto Caribou Road. Deputy Lovell 
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activated his overhead lights with the intent to perform a traffic stop at 
about the same time Defendant activated the right turn signal. Defendant 
stopped her vehicle on the right side of Caribou Road and Deputy Lovell 
performed a traffic stop. 
(R., pp.89-90.) 
On approaching Lewis, Deputy Lovell discerned that she was intoxicated. (Tr., 
p.17, Ls.1-25.) Deputy Lovell placed Lewis under arrest for driving under the influence. 
(Tr., p.17, Ls.15-19.) As Lewis had been convicted with driving under the influence at 
least twice before, the State charged Lewis with felony driving under the influence. (R., 
pp.35-38.) Lewis filed a motion to suppress the evidence acquired in the traffic stop, 
challenging the basis for the traffic stop. (R., pp.54-55.) After carefully reviewing the 
evidence presented to the district court, the court found both that Lewis's infraction of 
crossing the fog line by itself gave the officer reasonable suspicion to enforce a traffic 
stop, and that Lewis's erratic driving pattern gave the officer reasonable suspicion to 
enforce a traffic stop based on the totality of the circumstances, and so denied the 
suppression motion. (R., pp.88-95.) 
Lewis entered a conditional guilty plea to the felony charge of driving under the 
influence, reserving her right to appeal from the denial of her suppression motion. (R., 
pp.99-104.) Pursuant to the plea agreement, Lewis pied guilty. (R., pp.109-1 O; Tr., 
p.73, Ls.20-23.) The district court entered judgment of conviction and sentenced Lewis 
to a unified term of six years with three years fixed. (R., pp.111-14.) Lewis filed a Rule 
35 motion requesting leniency (R., pp.117-18), which the district court granted, reducing 
the fixed portion of her sentence to two years (R., pp.119-20). Lewis filed a timely 
notice of appeal. (R., pp.122-24.) 
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ISSUES 
Lewis states the issue on appeal as: 
Mindful of the fact that crossing over or onto the fog line on a 
roadway constitutes a traffic infraction, did the district court err when it 
denied Ms. Lewis' motion to suppress the State's evidence? 
(Appellant's brief, p.5.) 
The State rephrases the issue as: 
Has Lewis failed to show error in the district court's order denying her motion to 
suppress evidence? 
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Lewis Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Order Denying Her Motion To 
Suppress Evidence 
A. Introduction 
Challenging only the basis for the traffic stop, and "mindful of the fact that the act 
of crossing over or onto the fog line is a traffic violation, Ms. Lewis nonetheless asserts 
that the district court abused its discretion when it denied her motion to suppress the 
State's evidence in this case." (Appellant's brief, pp.6-7.) Lewis has failed to establish 
error in the district court's correct application of the law to the facts found at the 
suppression hearing. The judgment of the district court should therefore be affirmed. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision 
on a motion to suppress is challenged, [the Court] accept[s] the trial court's findings of 
fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but ... freely review[s] the application of 
constitutional principles to the facts as found." State v. Faith, 141 Idaho 728, 729-30, 
117 P.3d 142, 143-44 (Ct. App. 2005). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess 
the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual 
inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 
P.2d 993, 997 (1995). 
C. The District Court Correctly Denied Lewis's Suppression Motion 
A routine traffic stop by a police officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's 
occupants and implicates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable 
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sea:-ches seizures. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); State v. 
Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 208, 953 P.2d 645, 648 (Ct. App. 1998). Because a routine 
traffic stop is normally limited in scope and duration, it is more analogous to an 
investigative detention than a custodial arrest and therefore is analyzed under the 
principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653-54. 
Under Terry, an officer may lawfully stop a suspect for investigative purposes only when 
the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed or is about to 
commit a crime. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30; State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 552-53, 961 
P.2d 641, 643-44 (1998). 
Lewis only challenges the district court's conclusion that Lewis's infraction of 
crossing over the fog line gave Deputy Lovell reasonable suspicion to enforce a traffic 
stop. (See Appellant's brief, pp.6-7.) An officer who has observed a traffic infraction, 
even if minor and insignificant, has reasonable suspicion to stop the driver who 
committed that infraction. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). As 
previously decided by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Slater, 136 Idaho 293, 32 
P .3d 685 (Ct. App. 2001 ), crossing the fog line, even fleetingly, constitutes a traffic 
infraction. The Court said: 
Idaho Code § 49-630(1) requires that a vehicle be driven on the right half 
of the roadway, except in certain circumstances that are not applicable in 
this case. The "roadway" means that portion of a highway that is 
"improved, designed or ordinarily used for vehicular travel." It does not 
include "sidewalks, shoulders, berms [or] rights-of-way." Accordingly, 
when Officer Burns observed Slater's tires cross the fog line, albeit 
fleetingly, Burns now possessed the requisite reasonable suspicion that 
Slater had violated I.C. § 49-630 by driving on the shoulder of the 
highway, rather than on the "roadway." 
Slater, 136 Idaho at 298, 32 P.3d at 690. 
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Slater controls the outcome of this case. The facts are dispute: Lewis 
crossed over the fog line. (R., p.93.) Because crossing over the fog line, even if only 
fleetingly, is a traffic infraction, Deputy Lovell had reasonable suspicion to stop Lewis. 
The judgment of the district court should therefore be affirmed. 
This Court may also affirm the judgment of the district court on the alternative 
basis articulated by the district court below. Lewis does not challenge the district court's 
alternative conclusion that Deputy Lovell had reasonable suspicion to investigate the 
DUI based on the totality of the circumstances, which included Lewis's swerving prior to 
first pulling off the road, her failure to notice Deputy Lovell when he pulled up behind 
her, ignoring the officer's arrival as she pulled back onto the road, her continued 
swerving after returning to the road, and her driving over the fog line before swerving 
back left into her lane. (R., pp.94-95.) Where a basis for the district court's ruling is not 
challenged on appeal, the appellate court will affirm on the unchallenged basis. State v. 
Goodwin, 131 Idaho 364, 366-67, 956 P.2d 1311, 1313-14 (Ct. App. 1998). The 
judgment of the district court should therefore be affirmed. 
Lewis has failed to establish error in the district court's correct application of the 
law to the facts found at the suppression hearing. The district court correctly denied 
Lewis's suppression motion, and its judgment should be affirmed. 
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CONCLUSION 
The respectfully ;equests that this Court affirm the district court's order 
denying Lewis's suppression motion. 
DATED this 14th day of December, 2011. 
~~ 
'----R~LJ~R 
Deputy Attorney General 
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